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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
he has a contract and that he has acquired contract rights. It were better public
policy to prohibit entirely the issuance of such contracts. * * * I suggest that
the matter may well receive the serious consideration of the legislature."
VINCENT T. HARTNETT
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-INJUNCTIONS. - Defendant
had been employed as driver of the plaintiff's wagon, collecting and delivering
towels on one of the plaintiff's routes for eleven years. In 1930 he was made
route foreman, and thereupon he entered into a contract with the plaintiff
whereby the latter agreed to pay him a stated wage, and the defendant agreed
that he would not within two years after leaving plaintiff's employ in any way
carry on a similar business with the plaintiff's customers. The contract could be
terminated by either party by a two weeks' notice. In 1932 the defendant was
discharged. He sought employment elsewhere, but was unable to find it.' Because
of a physical disability, his appearance made it quite impossible for him to secure
work in most other lines. He then entered into the employ of a competitor of
the plaintiff, and now the plaintiff seeks to enjoin him from continuing such
work. Held, injunction denied. The contract is an unreasonable restraint of trade
and therefore unenforceable. Milwaukee Linen Supply Co. v. Ring (Wis. 1933),
246 N.W. 567.
A bargain is in restraint of trade when its performance would limit compe-
tition in any business or restrict a promisor in the exercise of gainful occupation.
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 513, (1932),' and is illegal if the
restraint is unreasonable. Ibid, Sec. 514; 4 Harv. L. Rev. 128ff (1890). Society
has an interest in such contracts and will protect itself by protecting individuals
who have become parties to such, depriving themselves of individual freedom
and endangering their means to a livelihood. However, reasonable restraints will
be allowed. Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 515; 31 Harv L. Rev. 193 (1917).
The test of reasonableness is less stringent in the case of sales contracts than
in employment contracts, for the vendor is in a better position to protect him-
self in the sales contract than the employee in the employment contract. 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 555 (1921), but see Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W.
412 (1911), in which Vinje, J. says there is no reason for a distinction. The
restraint is unreasonable if it is greater than required for the protection of the
person for whose benefit it is imposed. Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 515-a;
Berlin Mach. Works v. Perry, 71 Wis. 495, 38 N.W. 82 (1888). The restraint
must be qualified as to time, place, and circumstance. Restatement of Contracts,
Sec. 515, comment C: Berlin Mach, Works v. Perry, supra. But such limitations
'In My Laundry Co. v. Schineling, 129 Wis. 597, 109 N.W. 540 (1906), Marshall,
J., stated that evidence that the defendant depended for a livelihood upon work
in the industry from which he is restrained by the contract is properly ex-
cluded as being irrelevant. But this does not seem to be the general practice,
for many cases including the present have been decided at least in part on
such evidence.
2 This is one of the first Wisconsin cases in which the Restatement of the Law
of Contracts is cited. Mr. Chief Justice Rosenberry of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court stated before the Milwaukee Bar Association last January, "The prop-
ositions laid down in the restatement would, by reason of the carefulness and
thoroughness in which they are made, be accepted as a correct statement of
the law and that anyone who claimed that the propositions there laid down
were not correct statements of the law would have the burden of overthrow-
ing the statement."
RECENT DECISIONS
go only to prove or disprove the reasonableness of the contract. Nordenfelt v.
Nordenfelt, (1894) Ap. Cas. 535; 8 Harv. L. Rev. 355 (1895). The.plaintiff
must show there was a valid consideration. Durbrow Con'm. Co. v. Donner, 201
Wis. 175, 229 N.W. 635 (1930); that the breach causes irreparable damage.
Berlin v. Perry, supra. But if the contract is valid there is a property right to be
protected. Palmer v. Tots, 96 Wis. 367, 71 N.W. 654 (1897), and equity alone
can furnish adequate relief. Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, supra; My Laundry
Co. v. Schmeling, 129 Wis. 597, 109 N.W. 540 (1906). The restraining clause
must be ancillary to a contract for the transfer of the good will or other sub-
ject of property or to an existing employment or contract for employment.
Restatement, Sec. 515-b; Chain Belt Co. v. Von Spreckelsen, 117 Wis. 106, 94
N.W. 78 (1903). It has been held that it is sufficient if the employee contracted
not to cause the damage which would result from his competing with the em-
ployer after he left his employ, where the employee had personal contact with
the customers and the employer did not. Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, supra. If
the terms of the contract indicate that it is unreasonable, because it extends over
too long a period or too large a space, there is a conflict of authority as to whether
a court should grant a decree enjoining the defendant as to a reasonable time
and space. The court did so in Whiting v. O'Connel, (lass. 1931), 179 N.E.
169, but this decision was criticized as being a peculiar doctrine to Missachu-
setts and Kentucky; that courts should not aid an employer who uses his ad-
vantage over an employee to frame an unreasonable restraining clause. 45 Harv.
L. Rev. 751 (1932). Where the contract is unreasonable- as a whole, but the
language permits a construction that it is severable, it will be enforced within
such smaller limits as are reasonable, but if such smaller limits are not defined
by the contact itself the court cannot say how much is a reasonable restraint
and enforce that. General Bronze Corp. v. Schineling (Wis. 1932), 245 N.W. 469;
20 Harv. L. Rev. 154 (1906). Where areas are disjunctively described there is
a proper basis for dividing the covenant and enforcing it in the territory which
is properly restricted. General Bronze Co. v. Schmeling, supra. In the present
case there is no indication that the contract was severable, and the court re-
fused to grant an injunction as to a reasonable territory. The present contract
is unreasonable in the light of present financial conditions. The present case does
not overrule the Eureka Laundry Co. case, but indicates that such contracts may
be reasonable in prosperous times, but unreasonable in times of depression.
JOHN F. SAVAGE
FIxTURES-MIECHANIcS LIENS-CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACrs.-Defendant,
conditional vendor of machinery under an unrecorded agreement, contested plain-
tiff constructor's suit against principal defendant to foreclose a mechanic's lien on
building, machinery, and leasehold of a rendering plant, asking that such machin-
ery be exempt from the lien. A finding that the machinery was permanently an-
nexed to said realty raised the question of whether plaintiff's lien covered ma-
chinery, now annexed to realty, sold under a conditional sales agreement without
notice to the plaintiff lienor. Held, that trade fixtures permanently affixed to the
realty are subject to mechanic's liens unaffected by conditional sales contracts
of which lienors had no notice. Geer Co. v. Wolcott et al. (Neb. 1933), 246 N.W.
456.
The annexation of fixtures to realty raises perplexing questions in this re-
gard, and the decisions are by no means uniform. Practically all the cases hold
notice prerequisite to the preservation of the conditional vendor's rights against
